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ABSTRACT 
This paper integrates two strands of literature on overskilling and disability using the 
2004 British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). It finds that disabled 
workers are significantly more likely to be skill mismatched in the labour market and 
that the adverse effect of mismatch on earnings is particularly acute for this group. 
Giving workers more discretion over how they perform their work may significantly 
reduce these negative effects.  
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I  Introduction 
 
This paper combines two strands of the labour economics literature, that dealing with 
the incidence and impact of disability, and that on the effects of skill mismatch. The 
literature on the first of these strands covers a number of issues. Using a consistent 
definition, the rate of self-assessed disability among the working age population has 
been shown to vary considerably among EU member states, from 6.6 per cent in Italy to 
32.2 per cent in Finland in 2002 (Dupre & Karjalainen, 2003). However, the reliability 
of such international data has been called into question, since individuals in different 
countries may have different incentives to report disability, even when measured using 
identical survey questions.
1
 Notwithstanding these problems, disability is numerically 
much more important in most countries, for instance, than membership of various ethnic 
minorities, an issue on which there is a much more extensive literature. Further, 
employment rates for disabled individuals are much lower than for the non-disabled, 
varying among OECD countries in the late 1990s for those of working age from 20.8 
per cent in Poland against 71.2 per cent for the non-disabled, to 62.2 per cent in 
Switzerland against 79.1 per cent for the non-disabled (OECD, 2003). Understanding 
the reasons for this and for the disability earnings gap has preoccupied much of the 
existing literature. Following DeLeire (2001) and Jones, Latreille and Sloane (2006), it 
has become common to distinguish between work-limited and non-work-limited 
disabled, with the disability affecting the amount and nature of work that the individual 
can do only in the former case. This approach attempts to facilitate the distinction 
                                                 
1
 For example, based on evaluations of the health of hypothetical individuals in internet surveys, 
Kapteyn, Smith and van Soest (2007) use these so called vignettes to correct individual responses to 
questions relating to work disability in the US and the Netherlands. They find a higher rate of self-
reported disability in the Netherlands than in the US, of which over half is explained by response scale 
differences.  
 
 3 
between discrimination and the unobserved impact of disability on productivity as 
explanations for their labour market disadvantage. The evidence suggests the latter 
effect is more important (DeLeire, 2001; Jones et al., 2006).  
 
The second strand of literature, on skill mismatch, has concentrated on overeducation 
(and to a lesser extent undereducation), with the main findings being that there are pay 
penalties to being overeducated (see Sloane, Battu & Seaman, 1999) and reductions in 
job satisfaction (see Battu, Belfield & Sloane, 1999; Chevalier, 2003; Fleming & Kler, 
2007). More recently, studies have focused on overskilling as new data sets have 
become available which include a relevant question, such as the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) panel survey, the British Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey, 2004 and The Flexible Professional in the Knowledge 
Society (REFLEX) survey for a number of European countries (see Allan & Van der 
Velden, 2001; Green & McIntosh, 2007; McGuinness & Wooden, 2009; Mavromaras et 
al., forthcoming). These find strong negative effects of overskilling on both wages and 
job satisfaction.
2
 
  
The relationship between education or skill mismatch and disability in the labour 
market has been largely ignored, even to the extent of not always controlling for 
disability in the regression analyses. One recent exception is Blazquez and Malo (2005), 
who use Spanish data from the European Community Household Panel 1995-2000. 
Their finding of no significant relationship between disability and educational mismatch 
is surprising given, as they note, that there are good reasons to expect the problem of 
overeducation to be more acute for disabled workers.  
                                                 
2
 Our results are consistent with the existing literature, though the job satisfaction results are not reported 
here for reasons of space. 
 4 
 
As with other minority groups, employer discrimination would reduce the probability of 
employment, so that disabled individuals may be more likely to accept employment 
which does not fully utilise their skills or qualifications. Similarly, the unobserved 
productivity effect of a disability, by lowering productivity (for a given set of 
educational characteristics), would also reduce employment prospects. However, there 
is another line of argument, found in Battu and Sloane (2004). They suggest that, for 
ethnic minorities, spatial constraints on job search increase the probability of 
educational mismatch. However, constraints on job search for disabled individuals may 
be multidimensional, including not only geographical location, but also the physical (or 
emotional) demands of employment, hours of work and accessibility. These many 
induce disabled individuals to search in a smaller pool of jobs and be more at risk of 
accepting ‘mismatched’ employment. Moreover, it is also possible that onset of 
disability reduces an individual’s ability to work and so increases their probability of 
being underskilled (conditional on remaining in the same job). In contrast, if onset of 
disability is accompanied by a transition into less demanding work, there may be a 
greater risk of overskilling.  
 
In this paper we make use of WERS 2004 to assess the incidence of overskilling and 
underskilling for disabled workers, differentiated according to whether or not the 
disability is work limiting, compared to the effect on the non-disabled. We find that 
disabled workers are more prone to both overskilling and underskilling than the non-
disabled. The adverse wage effect of overskilling is found to be particularly acute for 
the work-limited disabled.  
 5 
II  The Data 
 
WERS 2004 is a cross-sectional data set involving a national sample of interviews with 
managers from 2,293 establishments with at least five workers. In addition, up to 25 
employees at each workplace were randomly selected for the employee survey, giving a 
total of 22,173 usable responses.
3
 Employees were asked: Do you have any long-term 
illness, health problem or disability? By long-term, we mean that it can be expected to 
last more than one year. Those who respond positively to this are also asked: Does this 
illness or disability affect the amount or type of work you can do?  We define the work-
limited disabled as those who have positive responses to both questions. Those who 
respond positively to the first, but not the second, question are defined as non-work-
limited disabled, and those who do not have a long-term health problem form the non-
disabled group.
4
 This results in 11.9 per cent of employees being classed as disabled, 
with 4.5 per cent being work-limited and 7.4 per cent non-work-limited. These are 
lower than previous estimates of the population shares, consistent with the low rate of 
labour market participation among disabled individuals, and this should be borne in 
mind when considering the results presented in this paper. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to control for the potential selection bias that may arise as a result of this since 
employees form the entire sample in WERS. However, recent UK studies which control 
for non-random selection into employment produce mixed results. Jones et al. (2006) 
find a significant selection effect on the earnings of women, but not men, while Madden 
(2004) finds it significant only among ‘healthy’ men.  
                                                 
3
 Unfortunately, the nature of the data means it is not possible to consider the dynamics or persistence of 
skill mismatch. However, Blazquez and Malo (2005) find that mismatch has particularly severe 
consequences for disabled individuals as they have a lower probability of leaving this state to become 
matched and have a higher probability of exiting this state to unemployment or inactivity. 
4
 Individuals should only answer the second question following a positive response to the first. A small 
number of mutually inconsistent responses are dropped from the analysis.  
 6 
 
Although self-reported information on disability has been extensively used in labour 
market analysis (see, for example, Jones et al., 2006), it has been subject to a range of 
criticisms. Self-reported information is subject to measurement error, which arises 
because the response scales may differ between individuals. Further, these responses 
may be affected by labour market outcomes. For example, individuals may use 
disability to justify their (inferior) labour market status (the so called ‘justification bias’ 
hypothesis). However, the existing literature also provides positive conclusions about 
the reliability of self-reported measures. For example, Benitez-Silva et al. (2004) note 
that subjective measures of disability have been found to be powerful predictors of a 
range of labour market outcomes; and a large proportion of the population in their own 
study were found to have comparable reporting of disability to thresholds used by the 
Social Security Administration. In this paper we do not focus on the participation 
decision and so we would expect the extent of any reporting bias to be smaller among 
employees. Further, we make use of the distinction between work-limited and non-
work-limited disability, and there would seem to be less incentive to misreport the 
latter. Indeed, in previous work the non-work-limited disabled have been shown to have 
labour market outcomes far more similar to the non-disabled than the work-limited 
disabled (see, for example, Jones, 2006). There are, however, also wider issues of 
endogeneity which should be acknowledged because work may affect health 
(Lindeboom & Kerkhofs, 2009), though the precise size of such effects has been 
disputed (see Cai, 2009a, 2009b).
5
 Indeed, when Madden (2004) controls for the 
selection into disability status when examining earnings discrimination in the UK he 
finds it makes little difference to the results. 
                                                 
5
 These studies typically use measures of health or health related behaviour to instrument disability status. 
However, no further information about health is available in WERS. 
 7 
 
In WERS, employees were asked a direct question about overskilling, the advantages of 
which, relative to the typical measures of overeducation, are outlined by McGuinness 
and Wooden (2009). Specifically they were asked How well do the work skills you 
personally have match the skills you need to do your present job?. Their response is 
listed on a five point scale as much higher, a bit higher, about the same, a bit lower and 
much lower, enabling us to distinguish three categories – overskilled, matched and 
underskilled, based on the employees’ own perceptions of their skills and those required 
to do their job.
6
  
 
We do not attempt to estimate the extent of over- and under-education in this paper. 
Though it is possible to impute it using the empirical method, a substantial number of 
respondents have other vocational qualifications, which are difficult to interpret in 
relation to their level. However, consistent with previous evidence (see, for example, 
Jones et al., 2006), disabled individuals are significantly less likely to have a first 
degree, A levels or AS levels than the non-disabled, and significantly more likely to 
have no academic qualifications (see Table 1). Furthermore, the work-limited disabled 
are less well qualified than the non-work-limited disabled. These differences would 
reduce the likelihood of finding that overeducation was a more serious problem for 
disabled individuals. It is not possible, for example, to be overeducated if you have no 
qualifications, which is the case for roughly a quarter of disabled individuals.  
 
                                                 
6
 Overskilled includes much higher and a bit higher, whereas underskilled includes a bit lower and much 
lower.  A complete list of descriptive statistics is contained in Appendix Table 1. 
 8 
The main limitation of our overskilling variable is that, like our disability measure, it is 
subjective, which means the responses of individuals may not be directly comparable.
7
 
In what follows we treat the individual’s subjective assessment as accurate. Although 
there may be a relationship between an individual’s threshold for reporting disability 
and reporting a skill mismatch, the direction of such relationship is not obvious.
8
 
Comparisons between the non-work-limited disabled and the work-limited disabled in 
Table 2 indicate that both disabled groups are significantly more likely to report having 
“much higher” skills than those required to do their job than the non-disabled. However, 
since there are fewer economic incentives to misreport non-work-limiting disability, it 
would seem less likely that overskilling among this group is a result of reporting bias. In 
fact, if discrimination exists, one may argue that disabled employees are unusually 
better placed than their employers to assess their work skills and abilities. Returning to 
Table 2, it is interesting to note that a greater proportion of disabled workers also report 
being underskilled, but this sample is small and the differences are not significant. 
Finally, it is also important to highlight that differences in skills and abilities between 
the disability groups, for example, those which stem from the gap in educational 
attainment, do not necesssarily imply underskilling, since job requirements also vary 
and individuals are asked about their skills in relation to those required in their present 
job. 
 
A couple of other features of the data are worth noting. Consistent with their lower 
average educational attainment there is evidence that a smaller proportion of the work-
limited disabled are concentrated in occupations that typically have the highest skill 
                                                 
7
 Overeducation has also been measured subjectively in most studies and there is no evidence that 
individuals exaggerate the extent to which the job requires the level of education they possess.  
8
 It is potentially the case that those who overestimate the extent of their disability also overestimate their 
skills.  
 9 
levels (manager or senior official; professional; and associate professional). They are 
also more concentrated in manufacturing; transport and communication; and public 
administration sectors. Further, regardless of the precise measure, disabled individuals 
report having less influence over their job. For example, 34.1 per cent of work-limited 
disabled workers report having little or no influence over the tasks you do in your job 
compared to 25.9 per cent of the non-disabled; also, 23.1 per cent of work-limited 
disabled workers report having little or no influence over the order in which you carry 
out tasks compared to 17.0 per cent of the non-disabled.
9
 
 
III Methodology 
 
(i) Determinants of Mismatch 
The first stage is to estimate the determinants of underskilling and overskilling, 
distinguishing between non-work-limited and work-limited disabled. Since there are 
three possibilities, the multinominal logit model seems appropriate. This estimates two 
sets of coefficients, 
1  (underskilled) and 3  (overskilled). From these we can calculate 
the probability Pij of an individual i being underskilled (j=1) or overskilled (j=3) 
conditional on a vector of characteristics ix . The probability of individual i being in 
under- (over-) skill group j relative to the probability of being in the default group 2 
(skill matched) is given by: 
)](exp[ 2
2
  ji
i
ij
x
P
P
   for j=1,3.  (1) 
With normalisation of 
2  to equal 0 to permit identification of the model, the 
probabilities are: 
                                                 
9
 Preliminary analysis suggests this is not just a consequence of the types of jobs the work-limited 
disabled hold. 
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  3,12 ]]exp[1[ 1j jii xP        for j=2.  (2) 
 

3,1
]]exp[1[
]exp[
j
ji
ji
ij
x
x
P       for j=1,3.  (3) 
 
WERS contains a rich set of covariates which, in addition to controls for disability 
status, include personal and workplace related characteristics. The controls for personal 
characteristics include gender, age, ethnicity (white or non-white), highest academic 
qualifications and marital status. We also control for work related characteristics 
including part-time employment, having a temporary contract, union membership, 
tenure, (log of) workplace size, whether the workplace is part of a larger organisation as 
well as sector, industry, occupation and region of work. All the reported estimates from 
the econometric models are unweighted; weighted regressions generally produce similar 
results. 
(ii) The Effect of Mismatch on Earnings  
Next, we estimated the effect on wages of being disabled or skill mismatched. Since 
usual gross weekly pay is banded into 14 groups, interval regression is the appropriate 
procedure, as the dependent variable is categorised and ordered and the cut-off points 
are known. Under such circumstances, OLS regressions using the mid-point of the pay 
band may generate inconsistent estimates (Stewart, 1983). In practice, OLS and the 
interval regression estimates produce very similar results so here we only present the 
former, which are easier to interpret. The midpoint of the pay band is adjusted for usual 
 11 
weekly hours to create a continuous measure of hourly pay.
10
 The resulting earnings 
function is given by:  
 
iiiii SSZy   33211ln        (4) 
 
where iyln  is the log of the derived measure of hourly pay and iZ contains personal and 
employment related characteristics including educational attainment, occupation and 
industry. Two dummy variables capture skill mismatch, namely, 1iS , which captures 
individuals who are underskilled and 3iS which captures those who are overskilled. 
Initially, variables for disability status are included in the earnings equations estimated 
on data pooled across the non-disabled, non-work limited disabled and work-limited 
disabled workers.  
 
Because these are matched employer–employee samples, there is both a within- 
establishment error term variance and an across-establishment error term variance. 
Under such circumstances, random effects GLS is less biased than OLS (see Moulton, 
1987). We also present random effects results for each of the three groups separately – 
the non-disabled, the non-work-limited disabled, and the work-limited disabled.
11
 
 
                                                 
10
 Examination of the resulting distribution of hourly earnings suggests a number of outliers where high 
hourly earnings are generated because a relatively short number of hours are reported. In a similar manner 
to Dolton and Pelkonen (2008), we trim 1 per cent off the upper and lower distribution of hourly wages 
and, reassuringly, the correlation between the derived pay measure and the mid point of the actual hourly 
pay measure (of which there are only 4 bands) is relatively high at 0.55. 
11
 The results are qualitatively similar, if instead, we control for workplace fixed effects. 
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IV Results 
 
(i) Determinants of Mismatch 
Disabled workers are significantly more likely to be mismatched than the non-disabled 
group (Table 3), the effect being stronger for the work-limited disabled as shown by the 
marginal effects in relation to underskilling, which is not significant for the non-work-
limited disabled. The work-limited disabled are nearly six percentage points more likely 
to report being overskilled than are the non-disabled. This is consistent with employers 
underestimating the skills of disabled workers and allocating them into less demanding 
roles.
12
 Since disabled workers may find it more difficult to obtain a job, they appear 
more prepared to trade-off higher skills for employment. The greater prevalence of 
underskilling is also consistent with disabled individuals being more constrained in job 
search.
13
  
 
In contrast to Frank (1978), we find that women are less likely to be mismatched than 
men. This finding may, however, reflect the self-assessed nature of our dependent 
variable and the greater tendency for men to overestimate their own skills and abilities 
(see, for example, Waldman, 1994). Older workers are less likely to be underskilled and 
more likely to be overskilled (though this is not reported in the table). Shorter durations 
of tenure are positively associated with being underskilled, while educational 
qualifications significantly increase the probability of being overskilled. Members of 
ethnic minorities are significantly more likely to be overskilled, again consistent 
                                                 
12
 Since both the work-limited and non-work-limited disabled have a higher probability of being 
overskilled, it suggests this is not entirely a consequence of differences in productivity but may reflect 
discrimination against the entire disabled group. 
13
 It may also reflect a lack of employer sponsored training among the disabled. We did experiment by 
including training in the multinominal logit, but there is potential reverse causation, since the overskilled 
are less likely to be offered training. Its inclusion does not alter the main results discussed above. 
 13 
perhaps with preparedness to trade-off skills to obtain a job. In contrast, single or 
married individuals, or those living with a partner, are less likely to be overskilled than 
those who are widowed, divorced or separated. 
 
As regards to structural factors, overskilling is positively associated with working in a 
larger workplace, where perhaps management–worker relations are less close; and is 
less likely to be present in single establishments, where the reverse may apply. We also 
constructed an index of worker control over their jobs which combined the ability to 
influence tasks, the pace of work, how the individual does the work, the order of work 
and time of arrival and finish of work. This index was found to have a negative impact 
on the probability of being mismatched and seems also to have important implications 
for the design of jobs.  
 
Though not reported in Table 3, the model includes a full set of controls for industry 
and occupation. Underskilling is significantly more prevalent in manufacturing; 
electricity, gas and water; and public administration, and less so in education than in the 
omitted sector (other community services). Overskilling is significantly less prevalent in 
construction; financial services; other business services; education; and health. The 
more skilled the occupation the stronger the probability of underskilling and the lower 
the probability of overskilling, consistent with job requirements being an important 
demand side influence on skill mismatch.
14
 Interestingly, the inclusion of controls for 
occupation and industry do not affect the impact of disability on overskilling, consistent 
with it being the allocation of roles within the broad occupational and industry groups 
that is driving the disability effect.  
                                                 
14
 We also experimented with the inclusion of workplace level controls for disability policies and 
practices but the main results are not sensitive.  
 14 
 
(ii) The Effects on Earnings 
Table 4 presents the results of OLS and random effects earnings equations. Columns (3-
5) split the sample into non-disabled, non-work-limited disabled and work-limited 
disabled respectively. The non-work-limited disabled suffer no wage penalty as a result 
of their status, consistent with the absence of an unobserved productivity effect. 
However, there is a significant wage effect of around five per cent for those who are 
work-limited disabled, being slightly smaller under random effects estimation. 
Similarly, there is no significant wage difference to being underskilled, but the 
overskilled suffer a significant wage reduction of around three per cent, consistent with 
the reduced productivity of an overskilled individual relative to an otherwise identical 
individual who is better matched. When the sample is split, the penalty to being 
overskilled is about two per cent for the non-disabled, six per cent for the non-work-
limited disabled and 10 per cent for the work-limited disabled. This is not surprising 
since the extent of overskilling reported by the work-limited disabled is greater. 
However, even after controlling for the extent of overskilling, disabled workers face a 
greater wage penalty from being in any given overskilled status.
15
 Importantly, this 
lends support for genuine overskilling amongst disabled workers since overskilling 
which arises from misreporting would not be associated with a wage penalty. Further, 
the larger penalty for overskilling among disabled workers is consistent with the 
arguments made above; that is, overskilled disabled workers may have more acute 
unobserved productivity, job search, or discrimination effects. The other variables 
behave as expected,
 
but it is worth noting that the pay penalty for work-limited disabled 
                                                 
15
 Results are not reported but specifications were estimated with separate controls for being severely and 
moderately overskilled. As expected the wage penalty is greater for the severely overskilled.  
 15 
women is less than for women in the other groups.
16
 Further, the work-limited disabled 
suffer a much larger pay penalty for being employed in a single establishment employer 
and gain no pay benefit from being employed in the public sector. All groups benefit 
from an ability to control the nature of their work. 
 
V Conclusions 
 
It is well known that disabled individuals are less likely to participate in the labour 
market than the non-disabled, and that the work-limited disabled suffer a pay penalty. In 
this paper we consider the possibility that disabled workers may be more prone than the 
non-disabled to skill mismatch. This is, indeed, confirmed by our regression analysis, 
both with respect to underskilling and overskilling. We are able to confirm that there is 
a pay penalty to being disabled, but it is significant only for the work-limited disabled; 
and that the additional pay penalty to being overskilled (but not underskilled) is larger 
for disabled workers.  
 
These results raise the questions of why employers would choose to hire disabled 
workers but not utilise their skills to the same degree as the non-disabled; and why 
disabled workers stay in jobs that do not fully utilise their skills. As to the first, 
employers may have low expectations about the capabilities of disabled workers and 
hire them only for less demanding jobs and/or offer them more routine tasks within any 
given employment. Alternatively, it may be that some employers require additional 
skills as compensation for hiring a disabled worker, either because of discrimination or 
unobserved productivity effects. As to the second, unlike the non-disabled group, 
                                                 
16
 The sole exception to this is the positive association between part-time work and hourly earnings. This 
appears to be a consequence of measurement error in reported hours of work. However, the key results 
discussed above are not sensitive to restricting the sample to full-time workers.  
 16 
disabled workers may have fewer opportunities within the labour market and would 
therefore be more willing to accept this type of employment.  
 
Clearly, further research is required to investigate these issues, and particularly to 
address the problems of measurement error and endogeneity associated with disability. 
Datasets combing information on labour market participation and health with detailed 
information on employment conditions and skill mismatch would assist here. Further, 
work that is also able to consider the dynamic nature of disability and mismatch is likely 
to enhance our understanding of their causes and persistence. 
 
Our results suggest that reducing the extent of their mismatch in the labour market 
would improve the earnings of disabled employees. Employers could be encouraged to 
more formally assess the skills and abilities of disabled employees. However, the 
evidence also suggests that giving workers greater discretion over how they perform 
their work tasks would have similar results. Greater flexibility for disabled employees in 
this respect would seem consistent with the reasonable adjustment element of the UK 
Disability Discrimination Act, as well as providing potential benefits to both employees 
and employers.  
 
 
 17 
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Table 1  
Academic Qualifications by Disability Status. 
 
 Highest academic qualification 
 Non-disabled Non-work-limiting disabled Work-limiting disabled 
Higher Degree 6.64 6.14 5.85 
First Degree 20.04 17.40** 14.68*** 
A level or AS level 15.02 13.14* 10.10*** 
GCSE level  25.69 25.92 24.45 
Other 16.22 16.03 19.89** 
None 16.39 22.37*** 25.02*** 
Notes: Data are weighted. ‘*’ ‘**’ ‘***’ denote significance from the non-disabled group at the 10 per cent, 5 
per cent and 1 per cent level respectively. 
 
Table 2  
Skill Mismatch by Disability Status. 
 
 How well do the work skills you personally have match the skills you need 
to do your present job? 
 Non-disabled Non-work-limiting disabled Work-limiting disabled 
Much higher 21.02 25.50*** 29.56*** 
A bit higher  32.25 31.69 29.97 
About the same 42.37 37.87*** 35.15*** 
A bit lower 3.68 4.08 4.26 
Much lower 0.68 0.86 1.07 
Notes: Data are weighted. ‘*’ ‘**’ ‘***’ denote significance from the non-disabled group at the 10 per cent, 5 
per cent and 1 per cent level respectively. 
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Table 3  
Multinomial Logit Model of the Determinants of Skill Mismatch. 
 
 Coefficients Marginal effects 
 Underskilled Overskilled Underskilled Overskilled 
Constant -1.502*** 0.109   
 (3.88) (0.68)   
Non-work-limited disabled 0.327** 0.225*** 0.008 0.048*** 
 (2.33) (3.72) (1.33) (3.35) 
Work-limited disabled 0.634*** 0.306*** 0.020** 0.058*** 
 (4.01) (3.99) (2.51) (3.27) 
Female -0.317*** -0.296*** -0.006* -0.067*** 
 (3.61) (7.87) (1.75) (7.39) 
Tenure 1-2 years -0.311** 0.196*** -0.014*** 0.054*** 
 (2.38) (3.31) (3.91) (3.87) 
Tenure 2-5 years -0.384*** 0.009 -0.013*** 0.010 
 (3.51) (0.17) (3.98) (0.79) 
Tenure 5-10 years -0.538*** -0.019 -0.017*** 0.005 
 (4.18) (0.34) (4.90) (0.37) 
Tenure more than 10 years -0.469*** -0.116** -0.014*** -0.020 
 (3.69) (2.07) (3.58) (1.46) 
Any vocational qualification  0.108 0.265*** -0.001 0.064*** 
 (1.31) (7.51) (0.47) (7.46) 
Other academic qualifications -0.053 0.355*** -0.009** 0.088*** 
 (0.36) (5.96) (1.98) (6.31) 
GCSE level qualifications  -0.063 0.569*** -0.014*** 0.140*** 
 (0.44) (9.97) (3.13) (10.62) 
A level qualifications 0.002 0.748*** -0.015*** 0.177*** 
 (0.01) (11.56) (-3.47) (12.78) 
Degree level qualifications 0.205 0.869*** -0.011** 0.201*** 
 (1.34) (13.48) (2.44) (14.61) 
Higher degree level qualifications 0.534*** 0.952*** -0.003 0.205*** 
 (2.81) (11.23) (0.52) (12.46) 
Single  0.010 -0.184*** 0.004 -0.046*** 
 (0.06) (2.77) (0.69) (2.86) 
Married  -0.103 -0.109** -0.002 -0.025* 
 (0.77) (2.04) (0.32) (1.92) 
Non-white 0.020 0.185** -0.003 0.045*** 
 (0.12) (2.55) (0.55) (2.64) 
Log workplace size 0.040 0.039*** 0.001 0.009*** 
 (1.57) (3.73) (0.72) (3.50) 
Single establishment 0.099 -0.119*** 0.006 -0.032*** 
 (0.98) (2.77) (1.60) (3.05) 
Public sector -0.122 -0.074 -0.003 -0.016 
 (0.91) (1.42) (0.62) (1.26) 
Control index -0.091*** -0.013*** -0.003*** -0.001 
 (8.79) (2.84) (8.57) (1.16) 
Likelihood ratio
2  1045.51 
[0.00] 
Observations 18770 
Notes: Data are unweighted. Model also includes controls for age, temporary contracts, part-time employment, 
trade union membership, presence of children and a full set of regional, occupational and industrial dummy 
variables which are not reported here. T statistics reported in parenthesis. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ indicate significance 
at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level respectively. The base category is having correctly matched 
skills. The figure in square brackets is a p-value based on the likelihood ratio test where the null hypothesis is 
that the slope coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
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Table 4  
The Determinants of Hourly Earnings 
 
 OLS Random Effects GLS 
 All All Non-
disabled 
Non-work-
limited 
disabled 
Work-
limited 
disabled 
Constant 1.202*** 1.204*** 1.213*** 1.084*** 1.125*** 
 (46.57) (36.53) (35.60) (9.77) (7.92) 
Non-work-limited disabled -0.000 0.001    
 (0.01) (0.16)    
Work-limited disabled -0.057*** -0.047***    
 (4.75) (4.18)    
Female -0.128*** -0.114*** -0.116*** -0.130*** -0.095*** 
 (21.27) (19.39) (18.54) (5.51) (3.26) 
Tenure 1-2 years 0.012 0.015* 0.012 0.014 0.070 
 (1.26) (1.69) (1.27) (0.36) (1.32) 
Tenure 2-5 years 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.029 0.047 
 (5.77) (5.30) (5.09) (0.86) (1.02) 
Tenure 5-10 years 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.062*** 0.058 0.092* 
 (7.20) (7.66) (6.83) (1.64) (1.92) 
Tenure more than 10 years 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.070** 0.134*** 
 (12.37) (12.48) (11.71) (2.03) (2.83) 
Any vocational qualification 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.036 0.085*** 
 (7.04) (7.38) (6.46) (1.61) (2.99) 
Other academic qualifications 0.085*** 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.056* 0.042 
 (8.87) (8.07) (7.88) (1.67) (1.05) 
GCSE level qualifications 0.133*** 0.112*** 0.115*** 0.127*** 0.109*** 
 (14.49) (12.73) (12.11) (3.84) (2.64) 
A level qualifications 0.201*** 0.180*** 0.181*** 0.240*** 0.157*** 
 (19.44) (18.07) (16.96) (6.28) (3.12) 
Degree level qualifications 0.300*** 0.262*** 0.267*** 0.296*** 0.232*** 
 (29.25) (26.33) (24.92) (7.83) (4.84) 
Higher degree level qualifications 0.356*** 0.319*** 0.321*** 0.375*** 0.351*** 
 (26.55) (24.51) (23.08) (7.26) (5.41) 
Part-time work 0.027*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.028 -0.003 
 (3.72) (8.44) (8.09) (0.97) (0.09) 
Trade union member 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.054** 0.070** 
 (10.11) (9.37) (8.98) (2.41) (2.44) 
Single -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 0.003 -0.075 
 (3.53) (3.08) (2.94) (0.09) (1.46) 
Married 0.017** 0.015* 0.018** 0.025 -0.023 
 (2.04) (1.88) (2.07) (0.82) (0.56) 
Non-white -0.072*** -0.057*** -0.060*** -0.023 -0.105* 
 (6.29) (5.04) (5.07) (0.46) (1.81) 
Log workplace size 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 
 (12.35) (8.48) (8.04) (3.46) (3.11) 
Single organisation -0.015** -0.014 -0.007 -0.032 -0.106*** 
 (2.13) (1.30) (0.65) (1.08) (2.85) 
Public sector  0.034*** 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.052 -0.059 
 (4.12) (2.85) (3.17) (1.54) (1.39) 
Underskill 0.006 -0.004 0.000 -0.038 -0.002 
 (0.45) (0.30) (0.03) (0.80) (0.04) 
Overskill -0.033*** -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.060*** -0.104*** 
 (6.32) (5.25) (4.19) (2.96) (4.01) 
Index of control 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 
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 (17.97) (17.63) (16.70) (4.46) (2.69) 
F-test 342.49 
[0.00] 
    
Wald
2   14169.39 
[0.00] 
13055.55 
[0.00] 
1233.28 
[0.00] 
664.27 
[0.00] 
Observations 18156 18156 15988 1343 825 
R-squared (overall) 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.51 0.48 
Number of workplaces - 1717 1709 867 618 
Notes: Data are unweighted. Model also includes controls for age, temporary contracts, presence of children 
and a full set of regional, occupational and industrial dummy variables which are not reported here. T statistics 
reported in parenthesis. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ indicate significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level 
respectively. The figures in square brackets are p-values based on the F-test or Wald test where the null 
hypothesis is that the slope coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
 23 
Appendix Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Non-
disabled 
Non-work-
limited 
disabled 
Work-
limited 
disabled 
Log hourly pay Log of hourly pay (midpoint band of weekly pay/usual weekly hours).  2.163 2.186 2.104 
Overskill Dummy variable equals 1 if employee reports their work skills are much higher or a bit higher 
than those required to do their present job; 0 otherwise. 
0.528 0.570 0.592 
Underskill Dummy variable equals 1 if employee reports their work skills are much higher or a bit lower 
than those required to do their present job; 0 otherwise. 
0.044 0.046 0.061 
Female Dummy variable if female; 0 otherwise 0.541 0.500 0.477 
Single Dummy variable if marital status is single; 0 otherwise 0.229 0.167 0.187 
Married Dummy variable if marital status is married or living with partner; 0 otherwise 0.673 0.728 0.707 
Separated/divorced/widowed 
(omitted) 
Dummy variable if marital status is either separated/divorced or widowed; 0 otherwise 0.098 0.105 0.106 
Children Dummy variable equals 1 if employee has dependent children; 0 otherwise 0.403 0.319 0.339 
Non-white Dummy variable equals 1 if non-white ethnic group (mixed, asian, black or chinese); 0 
otherwise 
0.061 0.044 0.048 
Age 16-21 (omitted) Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is aged between 16 and 21; 0 otherwise 0.064 0.027 0.026 
Age 22-29 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is aged between 22 and 29; 0 otherwise 0.164 0.095 0.078 
Age 30-39 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is aged between 30 and 39; 0 otherwise 0.262 0.158 0.199 
Age 40-49 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is aged between 40 and 49; 0 otherwise 0.266 0.268 0.295 
Age 50-59  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is aged between 50 and 59; 0 otherwise 0.202 0.365 0.331 
Age 60+  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is aged 60 and over; 0 otherwise 0.042 0.086 0.070 
Tenure <1 year (omitted) Dummy variable equals 1 if employee has been working at this workplace for less than 1 year; 
0 otherwise 
0.163 0.132 0.109 
Tenure 1-2 years Dummy variable equals 1 if employee has been working at this workplace for between 1 and 2 
years; 0 otherwise 
0.131 0.112 0.107 
Tenure 2-5 years Dummy variable equals 1 if employee has been working at this workplace for between 2 and 5 
years; 0 otherwise 
0.273 0.232 0.229 
Tenure 5-10 years Dummy variable equals 1 if employee has been working at this workplace for between 5 and 10 
years; 0 otherwise 
0.185 0.195 0.203 
Tenure 10 years+  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee has been working at this workplace for more than 10 0.249 0.330 0.353 
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years; 0 otherwise 
Any vocational qualification  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee has any type of vocational qualification; 0 otherwise 0.641 0.667 0.659 
No academic qualifications 
(omitted) 
Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s highest academic qualification is none; 0 otherwise 0.151 0.207 0.227 
Other academic 
qualifications 
Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s highest academic qualification is other (includes GCSE 
grades D-G); 0 otherwise 
0.153 0.162 0.200 
GCSE academic 
qualifications 
Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s highest academic qualification is GCSE level (grades 
A-C); 0 otherwise 
0.264 0.246 0.256 
A level academic 
qualifications 
Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s highest academic qualification is A level or AS level; 0 
otherwise 
0.150 0.133 0.110 
Degree level academic 
qualifications 
Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s highest academic qualification is degree level; 0 
otherwise 
0.211 0.188 0.149 
Higher degree level 
qualifications  
Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s highest academic qualification is higher degree level 
(masters degree or PhD); 0 otherwise 
0.070 0.064 0.057 
Temporary Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is on a temporary or fixed period contract; 0 otherwise 0.079 0.069 0.065 
Part-time Dummy variable equals 1 if employee usually works less than 30 hours per week; 0 otherwise 0.220 0.196 0.249 
Trade union member Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is a member of a trade union or staff association; 0 
otherwise 
0.355 0.455 0.483 
Occupation 1 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is manager or senior official; 0 otherwise  0.114 0.117 0.085 
Occupation 2 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is professional; 0 otherwise  0.121 0.126 0.105 
Occupation 3 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is associate professional and technical; 0 
otherwise 
0.170 0.155 0.144 
Occupation 4 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is administrative and secretarial; 0 
otherwise  
0.190 0.187 0.187 
Occupation 5 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is skilled trades; 0 otherwise  0.066 0.065 0.098 
Occupation 6 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is personal services; 0 otherwise  0.089 0.086 0.086 
Occupation 7 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is sales and customer services; 0 otherwise 0.070 0.056 0.065 
Occupation 8 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is process, plant and machine operatives; 0 
otherwise  
0.071 0.089 0.104 
Occupation 9 (omitted) Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is elementary; 0 otherwise  0.110 0.119 0.128 
Industry 1 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in the manufacturing industry; 0 otherwise  0.146 0.144 0.186 
Industry 2 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in electricity, water and gas; 0 otherwise  0.018 0.019 0.022 
Industry 3  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in the construction industry; 0 otherwise  0.047 0.038 0.049 
Industry 4 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in the wholesale and retail trade; 0 otherwise  0.099 0.084 0.098 
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Industry 5 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in the hotel and restaurant industry; 0 otherwise  0.026 0.019 0.019 
Industry 6 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in transport and communication; 0 otherwise  0.062 0.068 0.073 
Industry 7 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in financial services; 0 otherwise  0.063 0.055 0.047 
Industry 8 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in other business services; 0 otherwise  0.116 0.116 0.086 
Industry 9 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in public administration; 0 otherwise  0.081 0.110 0.101 
Industry 10 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in the education; 0 otherwise 0.121 0.118 0.107 
Industry 11 Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in health; 0 otherwise  0.159 0.181 0.161 
Industry 12 (omitted) Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in other community services; 0 otherwise  0.061 0.050 0.050 
Region 1 Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in the North East; 0 otherwise  0.041 0.045 0.040 
Region 2 Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in the North West; 0 otherwise  0.137 0.140 0.140 
Region 3 Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in Yorkshire and Humberside; 0  0.092 0.096 0.119 
Region 4 Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in the East Midlands; 0 otherwise  0.067 0.070 0.070 
Region 5 Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in the West Midlands; 0 otherwise  0.097 0.087 0.092 
Region 6 Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in the East of England; 0 otherwise  0.091 0.082 0.093 
Region 7 Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in London; 0 otherwise  0.104 0.107 0.080 
Region 8 Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in the South East; 0 otherwise  0.124 0.119 0.112 
Region 9 Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in the South West; 0 otherwise  0.088 0.083 0.087 
Region 10 Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in Scotland; 0 otherwise  0.112 0.113 0.106 
Region 11 (omitted) Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in Wales; 0 otherwise  0.046 0.059 0.058 
Single establishment Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is a single independent establishment not belonging to 
another body; 0 otherwise 
0.184 0.171 0.185 
Public Dummy variable equals 1 if public ownership; 0 otherwise 0.312 0.362 0.352 
Log workplace size Log of the total number of employees in the workplace. 4.764 4.803 4.814 
Control index Scale from 0-15 indicating greater control over nature of employment.
17
 9.966 9.865 9.167 
Notes: Data are unweighted and relate to all available observations.  
                                                 
17
 Creating by summing the following: influence over tasks, over pace of work, over how work is done, over order of work and on start/finish time. Each is ranked from 0-3 where 0 
indicates no control and 3 indicates a lot of control.  
